I have a client that is looking to get a website/mobile apps/desktop apps built that deal with very sensitive data (more sensitive than bank/card details). Because of the sensitive nature of the data, they do not want to save it in a central database but they still want their apps to synchronise (let's say I add some data into my mobile app, I then want to be able to go to my desktop app and see the same data).

I cannot think of a nice, reliable way of doing this and I am not sure there is one. Which is why I am here. Does anyone know how I could deal with this data?

One solution I was thinking about was to have a client side database on each app that would somehow sync between apps, I can see this being very unreliable and getting messy though.

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    If you want the data to be synchronized, it still has to be somewhere accessible, so the data can be pulled into your application. You could divide the data among more databases, thus if one of them gets somehow breached, you wouldn't leak all your data. If this satisfies the customer, just add more database connections to your application and pull your data from them.
    – Andy
    Commented Oct 20, 2015 at 15:41
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    Is this a peer to peer problem? or just 1 desktop talking to 1 smart phone (for each data space)?
    – ebyrob
    Commented Oct 20, 2015 at 15:45
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    You could ensure confidentiality in the database by encrypting the data on the server with a key which is only known to the user.
    – Philipp
    Commented Oct 20, 2015 at 15:48
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    This sounds like a scheme that somebody who doesn't understand security thought of. Whoever came up with this requirement should be formulating a question about securing data on Security.SE.
    – jpmc26
    Commented Oct 20, 2015 at 22:11
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    @user2424495: If the data needs to be available via a website, the data must be available where your website is served from - which is typically a central server. Or you'd need to write a browser plugin that supplies the data client-side.
    – Bergi
    Commented Oct 21, 2015 at 0:31

5 Answers 5


Plenty of sensitive information gets stored in databases. In fact, a central database is probably the most secure way to store this data. Large enterprise databases have tons of functionality to do things like encrypt sensitive information, to audit who accesses it, to limit or prevent people including DBAs from viewing the data, etc. You can have professional security experts monitoring the environment and professional DBAs overseeing backups so that you don't lose data. It would almost certainly be much easier to compromise data stored on some random user's mobile device or laptop than to penetrate a well designed security infrastructure and compromise a proper central database.

You could design the system with a central database that stores only encrypted data and store the user's private key on the user's device. That way even if the central database is completely compromised, the data is usable only by the user. Of course, that means that you can't restore the user's data if they lose their key (say the only copy was on their phone and their phone was damaged). And if someone compromises the key and, presumably, their login credentials, they would be able to see the data.

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    @user2424495 - If the goal is actual security, having the data stored centrally almost certainly wins. From a marketing standpoint, it may not be your fault if someone's phone is hacked. But it will certainly reflect poorly on the app if word gets out that it's relatively easy to hack (since most people's systems are very poorly secured). I'd rather explain to people that their data is stored encrypted using military grade security than to hope that they don't blame me when their poorly secured phone gets hacked. Commented Oct 20, 2015 at 16:39
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    This is the only answer so far that truly addresses the question and provides the best possible security outcome. The requirements the OP was given are ludicrous. If the data is so sensitive that the idea of the data even being available over a public network is offensive to users, then the app idea is not realistic. Full stop. Client devices are not secure and cannot be trusted.
    – maple_shaft
    Commented Oct 20, 2015 at 16:48
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    @mharr if the database stores only encrypted data (encrypted before leaving the device) it doesn't matter what a court order says, it physically can't be decrypted without the encryption keys, which only the user has. Commented Oct 20, 2015 at 21:21
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    @RichardTingle <tinfoil>Unless said government agency has broken the encryption already.</tinfoil>
    – Bob
    Commented Oct 21, 2015 at 1:18
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    I never said that the problem wasn't "interesting", I find the question and answers so far very intriguing and thought provoking. This is EXACTLY the kind of question that makes this site great. I am really questioning the requirements and some of the assumptions that are possibly being made about the data. My spidey sense just screams to me that these requirements and assumptions about the importance of the data are the musings of a bloviated and self worshipping company that fancies itself informed and insightful but in reality cont...
    – maple_shaft
    Commented Oct 21, 2015 at 16:29

You need to back up a couple steps and, in consultation with your client, work out a threat model. (Yes, that's a link to a 600-page book; yes, I am seriously recommending you read the entire thing.)

A threat model starts by asking questions like

  • Why does the app need to store this sensitive data in the first place?
    • Can you avoid storing it at all?
    • Can it be thrown away after a short time?
    • Does it truly need to be accessible to more than one device?
    • If it must be accessible on more than one device, does it need to be stored on more than one device?
  • Who are the people who are allowed to see each user's sensitive data?
    • Can this list be made shorter?
  • Who are the people who may come in contact with each user's sensitive data while trying to do their jobs, but have no need to know it?
    • Can this list be made shorter?
    • Can the data be rendered inaccessible to them without harming their ability to do their jobs?
    • If it can't be inaccessible, can it at least be made incomprehensible? (This is what encryption does, in the abstract: it renders data incomprehensible.)
  • Who are the people who want to see the sensitive data, but are not allowed?
    • What opportunities do they have to get at the data?
    • What do they want to do with the data once they have it?
    • How angry will they be if they don't get what they want?
    • How much money, time, CPU cycles, and human effort are they willing to spend?
    • Do they care if anyone knows they have seen the data?
    • Do they want to access specific users' sensitive data, or will anyone's do?
    • What do they already know?
    • What do they already have access to?

Once you know the answers to these questions you will be in a much better place to figure out what to do.

Keep in mind that there might be more than one answer to each set of questions, especially the ones dealing with the attackers (the people who want the sensitive data but are not allowed to have it). If you can't think of at least half a dozen different archetypal attackers, with different motivations, goals, and resources, you've probably missed something.

Also keep in mind that the attackers who cause you (and/or the client) the most trouble, are the most likely to make a giant splash in the media if their attack succeeds, or who do the largest amount of aggregate damage, probably are not the attackers who can cause the greatest harm to individual users if their attack succeeds. Your client's company rationally cares more about aggregate damage, but the users rationally care more about harm to themselves.

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    This doesn't really try to answer the question or disprove it, but this really is an awesome answer to a question that wasn't asked.
    – maple_shaft
    Commented Oct 21, 2015 at 2:54
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    @maple_shaft: Well, it answers the question that the OP meant to ask. Since the question could well be seen to suffer from X-Y problem, this seems a good answer.
    – sleske
    Commented Oct 21, 2015 at 8:27

One option to do the synchronization would be to do it peer-to-peer. This will still require a central server, but that server won't handle any of the data.

When a device goes online, a central server gets a notification with the user-id. When a second device of the same user goes online, the server sends both devices the IP addresses of the other. The devices can then exchange data directly. Caveat: one device needs to act as a server, so at least one can not be behind a NAT router.

Don't forget that you will need strong authentication and encryption for both the notification mechanism and for the peer-to-peer exchange.

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    Sounds like a versioning scheme would also be required to avoid sending all the data back and forth all the time between the two devices...
    – ebyrob
    Commented Oct 20, 2015 at 15:51
  • The p2p exchange would be a great solution, if it wasn't for the need of unnecessary setup forcing onto the end user, which, in my opinion, would make the usage of the application less user friendly. Then there is the question, whether the customer wants to choose between data vulnerability and a bit of a hussle when setting up the app, which depends a lot on how exactly sensitive the data is and how much the users care.
    – Andy
    Commented Oct 20, 2015 at 15:51
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    @DavidPacker assuming you set up and maintain the first server, what are the additional setup steps?
    – ebyrob
    Commented Oct 20, 2015 at 15:56
  • @ebyrob I might be misunderstood, but I understand it that the server provided by the app creator does not containg anything but the procedure for p2p synchronization. But the data has to be pulled through this server from one of the clients' devices - and the client has to make himself, or his data, accessible - this is the setup I have been talking about.
    – Andy
    Commented Oct 20, 2015 at 16:06
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    @David, Philipp is suggesting peer-to-peer exchange of the sensitive data, thus no sending of that to or even thru the central server. The central server is only there to facilitate one peer finding another peer; then it gets out of the way.
    – Erik Eidt
    Commented Oct 20, 2015 at 17:24

Make it somebody else's problem.

Store the data locally in each app, then give users the option to enable synchronization using their own account with a third-party service (Dropbox, Google Drive, etc). Also, think about encrypting any data uploaded to the third-party service (there are pros and cons to doing that).

This gives the appearance that users own their own data, since they have to opt-in to data synchronization. It makes the apps useful for people who don't want any sharing to happen. And it makes someone else responsible (technically and, potentially, legally) for the ongoing headaches of keeping any shared data safe.


Your client's concern seems to be about the visibility of this data. the first question to ask your customer is if the data was encrypted, where can it be stored? Then, ask your customer what kinds of access controls they want in place before the data can be decrypted and processed - where can the decryption key be stored? is is a seperate key per user? etc...

If your customer doesn't want the data stored anywhere, do they want the user to enter it my hand each time?

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